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The Promise and Peril of Cities and
Immigration Policy
Rick Su*
INTRODUCTION

In recent years, progressives have begun to embrace cities as meaningful sites of reform. From gay rights to environmental protection, a host of
progressive movements now look to urban policymaking as an important
part of their political playbook. Even as this enthusiasm for the city grows,
however, there remains one policy arena in which local involvement continues to raise substantial concerns: immigration. To be sure, much of the concern revolves around what powers, if any, cities even have to regulate or
respond to immigration.' Yet another reason for this appears to be that,
when it comes to immigration, the instinct is to see local involvement as a
threat to progressive policymaking. 2
But is this really an accurate assessment? Since the civil rights era,
progressives have long associated the local level with parochial interests and
petty prejudices. Given how this assessment is changing in other policy
arenas, however, particularly with regard to the role of cities, is it right to
import that framework wholesale into the immigration context today'? In
this essay, I suggest it is not. Rather than a bastion of racism and intolerance, the city, I argue, promises to be an important site for progressive reforms. As federal policies have increasingly turned to more aggressive
enforcement-oriented strategies, cities are one of the few political institutions drawing attention to the costs and consequences of such an approach.
Cities are also offering a pragmatic and moderating voice to what is increasingly becoming an ideologically driven debate. Either as an alternative to
federal policymaking and enforcement, or as a political platform in the national immigration debates, I argue here that progressive immigration advocates would do well to pay attention to the role that cities can play.
At the same time, progressives are right to be concerned about the involvement of cities in immigration policymaking and enforcement. We've
just been looking in the wrong place. While the focus thus far has largely
* Associate Professor of Law, SUNY Buffalo Law School; B.A., Dartmouth College; J.D.,
Harvard Law School. Special thanks to Justin Tresnowski and the editors of the Harvard Law
& Policy Review for their insightful comments and helpful suggestions in the editing process.
' Compare, e.g., Huyen Pham, The InherentFlaws in the InherentAuthority Position: Why
Inviting Local Enfrcement of Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution, 31 FiA. ST. U. L.
REv. 965, 967 (2004), with Kris W. Kobach, The QuintessentialForceMultiplier: The Inherent
Authority of Local Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 Ai B. L. Rv. 179, 183 (2006).
2 See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Civil Rights: State and Local Efforts to
Regulate Immigration, 46 GA. L. REv. 609, 617-19 (2012).
See, e.g., WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 155
(1964).
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been on how cities are affecting immigration policymaking, much of the
danger of immigration localism actually lies in how federal immigration
policymaking is also shaping the nature of cities and the urban policies that
they may want to pursue. On the one hand, the expansion of immigration as
a policy issue is shrinking the sphere of the city's authority. On the other
hand, by portraying immigrants as effectively a federal population, detached
from and outside of the communities in which they reside, immigration policy is affecting how cities see and respond to immigrant residents. In these
respects, while cities are steering immigration towards a more progressive
orientation, the manner in which immigration has evolved as a federal issue
might be steering the position of cities in the opposite direction.
By calling attention to the two competing progressive visions at play in
the relationship between cities and immigration, this essay highlights what I
refer to as the promise and peril of the convergence of cities and immigration policymaking. In Part I, I describe this convergence-which I refer to
as "immigration localism"-in more detail. Tracing the ways in which federal immigration efforts have been pushing down toward the local, and how
in response the local is also pushing back, I argue that a new federal-local
dynamic is emerging in the immigration context.
In Parts II and III, I outline how this new federal-local structure of
immigration policymaking and enforcement is affecting both immigration
and cities. Foregrounding the limits and disappointment of federal immigration policymaking and enforcement, Part II shows how cities are steering
national immigration policy in a progressive direction, and shaping the national debate as a result. This, I argue, is the promise of immigration localism. In Part III, however, I shift the analysis to focus on the city. Here, I
argue that the manner in which federal policies have framed immigration as
an issue, and immigrants as a population, threatens progressive visions of the
city. This, I suggest, is the peril.
Both of these aspects of local involvement in immigration-the promise and the peril-are often overlooked. As such the main goal of this essay
is to bring them to light. But this essay also suggests that the next step
forward for progressives interested in both immigration and the city is to
find policy proposals that can better reconcile these two sides of the same
coin. It is with these suggestions that I conclude.
I.

THE FEDERAL-LOCAL CONVERGENCE IN

IMMIGRATION

The promise and peril that I identify in this essay are based on the
mutual influence that the federal government and cities have on one another.
But how can such mutual influence exist when traditional theories of our
federal structure state that the federal government, cities, and the respective
policy matters assigned to them occupy separate jurisdictional spheres? The
answer I suggest here is that, like a number of other controversial policy
issues, there has been a steady convergence between the federal and local on
the issue of immigration.
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I refer to this growing federal-local convergence as "immigration localism," and I argue here that it is changing the relationship between the federal government and the city in a number of interesting ways. On the one
hand, while local participation has drastically increased the capabilities of
the federal government's interior enforcement efforts, it is also expanding
the influence and power of cities to shape immigration policies at the federal
level. On the other hand, while cities are now in a better position to exert
pressure on how immigration policies are developed and the manner in
which they are implemented on the ground, the role and power of cities are
also increasingly being defined by federal immigration priorities. Taken together, this back-and-forth is creating a political dynamic based less on jurisdictional authority and more on political negotiations and interactions. In
other words, as the traditional divide between the federal and the local
breaks down, the influence between the two spheres is mutual and growing.
A.

The Devolution of Immigration Regulation

Immigration is no longer exclusively federal, which is to say that when
it comes to immigration enforcement, the federal government is increasingly
reliant on the cooperation and assistance of state and local governments.
This devolutionary shift represents a departure from how the issue of immigration is normally conceived in our federal system. Yet it has greatly expanded the scope and reach of the federal government when it comes to its
immigration enforcement efforts. Indeed, of the nearly 400,000 immigrants
that have been deported annually in recent years-a record in and of itself4-up to a quarter were brought to the attention of federal authorities by
local officials.
It is easy to assume that the growing role of localities in the immigration arena is simply another case of jurisdictional overreach in the name of
localism or state rights. In reality, however, much of this development is the
result of shifting priorities at the federal level. In other words, localities are
being drawn into immigration enforcement because many see them as better
suited to the kind of federal enforcement initiatives that have recently been
gaining favor. There was little interest in local involvement when focus of
federal immigration regulations remained largely at the borders. But as inte4 See Julia Preston, Record Number of ForeignersWere Deported in 2011, Officials Say,
N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 7, 2012, at A12.
' Secure Communities and the 287(g) program are the two main federal programs that
involve federal-local cooperation. In 2011, 78,246 individuals were removed through Secure
Communities. See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMs ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEPTr OF HOMELAND
SEC.,
SECURE COMMUNITIES: IDENT/IAFIS
INTEROPERABILITY,
MONIHLY STLAJIS ics
THROUGH SErTEMBER 20, 2011, at 2 (2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foialscstats/nationwide-interoperability-stats-fy20l1-to-date.pdf. Data on the 287(g) program has
not yet been released for 2011, but, in 2010, it was responsible for the removal of 26,871
individuals. See U.S. IMMIGRALION & CUSTOMs ENFORCEMENI, U.S. DEP'I OF HOMELAND
SEC., 287(G) IDENTIFIED AIENS YOR REMOVAL 6 (2010), available at http://www.ice.gov/
doclib/foia/reports/287g-masterstats20lOoct31.pdf.
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rior enforcement became a priority in the 1980s and the 1990s as the number
of undocumented immigrants in this country grew, the prospect of local officials as "force multipliers" for federal immigration enforcement efforts began to draw more attention.'
Federal efforts to recruit local governments into federal immigration
enforcement efforts started slowly but accelerated soon afterwards. In the
mid-1990s, as so-called "sanctuary cities" began to resist cooperation in
federal immigration enforcements efforts,' Congress not only enacted legislation to bar these noncooperation policies but also authorized a more enduring model of federal-local cooperation through the adoption of what is now
widely known as the 287(g) program.' By the early 2000s, these legislative
efforts to open the door to local participation gave way to more aggressive
recruitment efforts in the executive branch. Many federal initiatives, like
Operation Community Shield, were designed specifically with federal-local
cooperation in mind.9 In addition, then-Attorney General John Ashcroft
went out of his way to encourage more local participation in immigration
enforcement efforts, in part by asserting that local governments had "inherent authority" to do so with or without federal authorization."' More recently, the Obama Administration not only unveiled another federal-local
initiative as its flagship interior enforcement strategy but also reversed
course on earlier assurances by making participation in the program
mandatory for all local jurisdictions."
Federal policy, however, is not the only reason why immigration has
increasingly become a local affair. Another is the growing number of states
that have passed laws mandating that local law-enforcement officials participate in federal immigration enforcement efforts on their own. Early on,
many states enacted antisanctuary provisions prohibiting local policies that
deprioritized immigration enforcement in any way, a step up from the antisanctuary measure in federal law. 2 Following the passage of Arizona's
controversial immigration measure in 2010,3 however, it became more common for states like Alabama and South Carolina to outrightly require that
6 See generally Kobach, supra note 1 (discussing local officials' roles as "force multipliers" in the immigration context).
7 See, e.g., Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism,Deportation, and Crime Victims AJaid to Call the
Police, 91 IOWA L. REv. 1449, 1455 (2006).
'See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006); LISA M. SEGHETTI ET AT,., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL
32270, ENFORCING IMMIGRATION LAW: THE ROLE OF STALE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
14-18 (2009), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl32270.pdf.
See Jennifer M. Chac6n, Whose Community Shield?: Examining the Removal of the
"Criminal Street Gang Member," 2007 U. CI. LEGAL F. 317, 327-33.
'o See PHILIP KRETSEDEMAS, THE IMMIGRATION CRUCIBLE: TRANSFORMING RACE, NATION,
AND IHE LIMITS OF THE LAW 79-80 (2012).
" See Jerry Markon, 'HardLook' at Immigration Law; Memo From 2002 Could Complicate Action Against Arizona, WASH. Posi, May 18, 2010, at A17.
12 See, e.g., Mick Hinton, States Double Migrant Laws, TULSA WoRLD, Aug. 8, 2007, at
A4; Tim Hoover, Immigration Restrictions Get Bipartisan Support: Missouri Senate OKs Bill,
KAN. CIY STAR, Apr. 27, 2006, at B.
" See SB 1070, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 0113, amended by 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 0211
(codified as amended at ARiz. REv. SLAL. ANN. § 11-1051 (Supp. 2010)).
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local officials take certain steps to confirm the immigration status of an individual in specific circumstances.14 Moreover, in many of these laws, provisions were included to increase the monitoring of local governments'
policies and ensure their compliance. For example, Arizona's law includes a
novel provision allowing any legal resident of the state to sue a local government jurisdiction for implementing policies that deprioritize immigration enforcement in any way," while Georgia's version creates an "Immigration
Enforcement Review Board" charged with investigating and sanctioning any
state or local government entity that fails to comply with the state's immigration mandate. 6
B.

The Cities Respond

These efforts to recruit (or compel) cities and other local governments
into federal immigration enforcement efforts have raised concerns about federal overreach and whether local officials are being unduly conscripted into
administering a federal program. Despite these fears about the loss of local
autonomy, however, it can be argued that the increasing reliance of the federal government on cities has actually increased the influence and power of
cities with respect to the issue of immigration. Cities have little control
when federal officials descend upon their community to perform an immigration sweep on a local neighborhood or an immigration raid of a local
business. But when a federal initiative depends upon the cooperation of the
city, local officials are also in a much better position to raise concerns, limit
their cooperation, or alter the manner in which the federal policy is implemented by varying the local conditions on the ground.
So how have cities responded to the growing pressure to participate?
To be sure, a small number of smaller cities have eagerly jumped in, even
going beyond what federal and state laws require." A larger proportion has
taken steps to comply, though with little enthusiasm. At the same time, a
significant number of cities are not only actively resisting participation in
federal immigration enforcement efforts but doing so in ways that are reshaping how federal policies on enforcement are implemented on the
ground. Notwithstanding federal and state efforts to prohibit noncooperation
'

See Brian Lawson, Law Puts State at Center of Debate on Immigration, BIRMINGHAM

NEWS, Aug. 14, 2011, at 14A.
See ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § II -105 1(H).
' 6 See GA. CODE ANN. § 50-36-3 (2012); see also Jeremy Redmon, Vidalia Faces Immigration Probe, ATLANTA J.-CONST., June 30, 2012, at B3 (discussing an investigation by the

Board into allegations that a Georgia city was harboring illegal immigrants).
" See, e.g., Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 521-29 (M.D. Pa. 2007);
see also Editorial,Immigration Battleftonts: FarmersBranch Should Sit Out Appeals Process,
DAIL. MORNING NEws, Aug. 2, 2007, at 20A (discussing an ordinance passed by the City of
Farmers Branch to prevent illegal immigrants from renting apartments).
ISSee, e.g., Karen Brandon, U.S. Weighs Local Role on Immigration; Some Police Fear
Dual Duty Would Hurt Minority Ties, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 14, 2002, at CIO (discussing the mixed
feelings of police in San Diego and Chicago about local law enforcement's role in
immigration).
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policies at the local level, creative drafting and sheer political will have ensured that "sanctuary cities" have not only survived but also proliferated. 9
Similar resistance can also be seen in the response that many cities and local
governments have adopted toward the now-mandatory implementation of
Secure Communities. Unable to block the data sharing with federal immigration authorities that is at the heart of Secure Communities, many local
jurisdictions, including Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Cook County in
Illinois, have simply announced that they will no longer comply with federal
immigration detainers as a matter of course, but will do so only if the immigration referral is also in accordance with their own internal policies.2 0
Cities are not only taking a stand on immigration by resisting efforts to
draw them into enforcement efforts but also making their case known in the
courts of law and public opinion. For example, when Arizona's controversial immigration mandate was enacted in 2010, not only did local leaders in
cities such as Tucson and Phoenix submit affidavits in support of the federal
challenge against the law,21 but cities both in and outside of Arizona also
submitted amicus briefs when the case was appealed. 22 Even before all of
this, cities that were not directly affected by this immigration enforcement
law or its progeny took action both to stake a position in the immigration
debates and to convey a particular image of their city. Cities as diverse as
Durham, San Francisco, Boulder, St. Paul, Boston, and Oakland, among
others, reacted in a variety of ways, such as passing formal resolutions that
denounced S.B. 1070 and taking steps to boycott Arizona for municipal
travel or business dealings. 23 More interestingly, appealing to intercity camaraderie, Portland issued a resolution specifically offering support to the
legal efforts of cities in Arizona opposing the Arizona law,2 4 while then-

" See, e.g., Susan Sachs, Mayor's New ImmigrantPolicy, Intended to Help, Raises Fears,
N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2003, at Al (discussing the implementation of a "don't ask" policy in
New York City and noting that similar policies have been adopted in Portland, Oregon; Fresno,
California; and Minneapolis, Minnesota).
20 See, e.g., Stephen Dinan, Sanctuary Cities May Be Facing Legal Action; Obama's
County Among Targets, WASH. TIMES, July 11, 2012, at Al; Ian Lovett, Los Angeles to Cease
TransferringImmigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2012, at A14.
21 See, e.g., Declaration of Roberto Villasenor, United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d
980 (D. Ariz. 2010) (No. CV-01413 PHX-SRB), available at http://www.justice.gov/opal
documents/declaration-of-roberto-villasenor.pdf (Tucson Police Chief); Declaration of Phoenix
Police Chief Jack Harris, United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (No. CV-01413 PHXSRB), available at http://www.justice.gov/opaldocuments/declaration-of-jack-harris.pdf; Declaration of Tony Estrada, United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (No. CV-01413 PHXSRB), available at http://www.justice.gov/opaldocuments/declaration-of-tony-estrada.pdf
(Sheriff of Santa Cruz County, Arizona).
22 See Brief for the Arizona Cities of Flagstaff, Tolleson, San Luis, and Somerton in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee, United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 1016645); Amicus Curiae Brief Submitted by the City of Tucson in Support of Plaintiff- Appellee, United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (No. 10-16645).
2 See Who Is Boycotting Arizona?, AZCENIRAL.COM (Aug. 27, 2010, 3:51 PM), http://
www.azcentral.com/business/articles/2010/05/13/20100513immigration-boycotts-list.html.
24 See Editorial,JoiningForcesAgainst Arizona's Law, OREGONIAN, June 17, 2010, available at http://www.oregonlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2010/06/joining-forces-against-arizona.
html.
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Mayor Gordon of Phoenix personally requested that other mayors reconsider
their cities' boycotts of Arizona out of consideration for the plight of
Phoenix. 25
In addition, cities have been able to exercise influence over immigration policy by taking steps to accommodate undocumented immigrants in the
face of the growing number of liabilities imposed by federal (and increasingly state) law. For example, the Los Angeles Police Department recently
announced that it would no longer impound cars driven by unlicensed drivers, many of whom are undocumented immigrants who cannot apply for a
driver's license under California state law. 26 Another effort that has attracted
much attention in recent years, and is starting to gain momentum in communities across the country, is the issuance of municipal identification cards.
One of the biggest liabilities to being undocumented is the inability to acquire official government identification, which limits the ability of undocumented immigrants to interact with government officials on routine matters
and transact business in the private sector. This liability, of course, is by
design: it is imagined that by making life difficult in the United States, many
undocumented immigrants will simply leave. Yet forcing them to the margins of society also creates difficulties for government and law-enforcement
officials who need to reach them. Some cities started to address this issue
for Mexican immigrants by accepting "Matrfcula Consular" identification
cards, which were issued by the Mexican consulate to nationals outside the
country, as a form of identification for certain transactions. 27 Others, however, are going further and issuing municipal identification cards of their
own. The municipal identification program was pioneered in New Haven in
2007.28 Since then, similar programs have been adopted in a number of cities, including Trenton, New Jersey, 29 and San Francisco and Oakland, California.3 o Just recently, Los Angeles also announced plans to institute such a
program and is currently taking steps to bring it online.3 ' The goal of municipal identification cards is to facilitate transactions between undocumented
immigrants and the city, private employers, and other service providers like
hospitals and banks.3 2 They also aid in interactions between undocumented
immigrants and the police.
25 See Ryan Lillis, Kevin Johnson Urges, Then Rejects, Arizona Economic Sanctions, SACBEE, Apr. 29, 2010, at B 1.

RAMENTO

See Editorial,Impounding Is Not the Answer, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2011, at A22.
See Rachel L. Swarns, Old ID Card Gives New Status to Mexicans in U.S., N.Y. TMEs,
Aug. 25, 2003, at Al.
28 See Kirk Semple, In Trenton, Issuing IDsfr
Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMEs, May 17,
2010, at A17.
29 Id.
3o See Ian Lovett, IDs fr IllegalImmigrants Take a Step in Los Angeles, N.Y. Truns, Oct.
17, 2012, at A23.
' Id.
32 See Semple, supra note 28.
Id. ("[T]he cards give illegal immigrants who fear detection and deportation more confidence about reporting crimes, and allow officials to help immigrants who are crime
victims.").
26
2
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Immigration Policymaking in an Era of Devolution

In recent years, responsibility for immigration enforcement is being
pushed down to cities and other local governments. At the same time, cities
are pushing back, either by resisting efforts to recruit them or by pursuing
immigration policies of their own. What has emerged is a system of immigration policymaking that is not tied to jurisdictional authority, but the product of interlevel negotiations and interactions. It also suggests a political
structure in which both federal and local actors are given more influence
over one another.
This dynamic is very different from the traditional federalism framework, which assigns issues like immigration to be decided and implemented
at specific sovereign spheres. Yet it also fits better with the way that many
legal and political observers are describing how controversial policy issues
are resolved today. But how should we feel about this development from a
progressive standpoint? In the next two parts, I suggest that the answer depends in large part on which perspective-immigration or the city-one
adopts.

II.

PROGRESSIVE IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE PROMISE OF THE CITY

Progressives in recent years have endorsed a number of key reforms to
our immigration system: a path to citizenship for the millions of undocumented immigrants now working and living in the shadows; an enforcement
regime that avoids the societal and human costs of indiscriminate and mass
deportations; and an admission system that is better attuned to the needs of
our economy and the immigrant roots of our country.3 4 To be sure, these
goals cannot be achieved without implementing changes to our nation's immigration laws, which explains why progressive advocates have largely focused their efforts at the federal level. Yet this is not the only, or even the
most effective, means to reform. Indeed, as I argue here, a promising path
also runs through the city.
This Part makes a progressive case for city involvement in immigration
policymaking and enforcement. It does so by showing how the position and
perspective of cities complement the federal government in useful ways in
the immigration context. Federal policymaking and enforcement, I argue,
are simply too detached from the costs and benefits of federal actions, and
unaccountable to the communities and individuals that are affected the most.
City leaders and other local officials, who often see the issue of immigration
in the opposite light, not only are more often aligned with progressive princi" See, e.g., MARSHALL Fiz & ANGELA KELLEY, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESs, PRINCIPLES
FOR IMMIGRATION REFORM: GUIDELINES FOR FIXING OUR BROKEN IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 2-4

(2009), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2009/12/pdf/
immigrationreform.pdf; see also Alvaro Huerta, We Need Real Immigration Reform, PROGRESSIVE (Mar. 20, 2013), http://www.progressive.org/we-need-real-immigration-reform.
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pies but also bring a valuable and unique perspective that is too often lost in
national conversations. For progressive advocates then, the city not only
constitutes an alternative venue for immigration policymaking, but it can
also serve as a powerful political platform for shaping the federal debates.
A.

The Dangers of PoliticalCentralization

There are many advantages to federal policymaking and enforcement in
the immigration context. Yet there are important limitations as well from a
progressive perspective. If the city holds promise in the context of immigration, it is because it complements federal policymaking and enforcement in
ways that address the dangers that these limitations produce. This section
discusses the dangers of political centralization in the immigration contextnot only with respect to how immigration policies are made, but also with
respect to how they are enforced.
One problem with political centralization is that it breeds a worrisome
detachment between regulators and both the targets and beneficiaries of regulations. This detachment is of particular concern with respect to policies on
immigration enforcement. To be sure, centralization expands the scope of
immigration as a policy issue; no longer a regional matter, it is now understood to be a matter of national concern. Yet the uneven distribution of
immigrants across the country means that most of the policymakers involved
in crafting immigration policies represent areas with little or no experience
with the immigration influxes that federal law is intended to address. 5
Moreover, given the diversity of the immigrant population, from migrant
farmworkers in America's rural communities to highly skilled immigrant entrepreneurs operating in the country's bustling urban cores, there is rarely a
common ground upon which to carry out a federal negotiation. What this
means is that, when it comes to immigration policymaking, not only are the
individual policymakers situated differently with respect to the issue, but
many of them do not have much skin in the game.
To be sure, this detachment is sometimes upheld as a reason for federal
policymaking; being above the fray, it is imagined, allows federal policymakers to consider the issue with a broad and dispassionate outlook and
craft policies that would privilege national interests over parochial
prejudices. 6 Yet as history shows, detachment from the actual costs and
benefits of the law that they are making usually drives policymakers to decide the outcome with respect to ideological principles rather than practical

" According to the 2000 census, more than two-thirds of all the foreign-born residents in
the United States lived in just six states: California, New York, Texas, Florida, Illinois, and
New Jersey. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, A DESCRIPTION OF THE IMMIGRANT POPULATION 1
(2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/60xx/doc6019/1I23-immigrant.pdf. It is also estimated that nearly half of the undocumented immigrant population is in either California or Texas. Id. at 8.
36 See Henderson v. Mayor of N.Y., 92 U.S. 259,
270-71 (1875).
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considerations.3 This might be a reason why federal immigration policies
often tend to be narrow in their outlook, while veering at times toward unenforceable extremes. For example, in recent years, even as it was becoming
clear that our current system of immigration admissions was both unenforceable and disconnected from our nation's needs, federal immigration policy
continued to fixate on its own enforcement: more punitive measures against
undocumented immigrants, 8 more grounds upon which legal migrants could
be removed," and further streamlining of the removal process. 40
Another danger with political centralization lies in the enforcement
context, and it has to do with the fact that federal immigration officials are
largely unaccountable to the communities in which they operate. While the
success of federal enforcement officials is measured largely in terms of the
number of undocumented immigrants identified and the speed with which
they are processed and removed, this is not necessarily aligned with the interests of the actual communities in which the officials' actions take place.
Moreover, because of the nature of the federal bureaucracy that enforces our
nation's immigration laws, complaints and protests about officials' tactics
and conduct often go unanswered. 4 1 This lack of local political accountability is made all the more worrisome by the fact that many immigration enforcement initiatives, especially the kinds that have been preferred by federal
officials in recent years, are highly disruptive: neighborhood sweeps and
workplace raids not only disrupt the routine flow of urban life for all residents, immigrants, and natives alike but also leave deep scars on the social
and political fabric of the local communities. 42
To be sure, when compared to local officials, it is often said that federal
agents are preferred because they have more specialized training on federal
immigration law and a better understanding of the constitutional constraints
under which they operate. Yet even with this training and knowledge, their
lack of political accountability may explain why federal agents routinely
overstep constitutional protections and engage in racial profiling, while also
becoming increasingly resistant to any kind of oversight. Indeed, one of the
most striking developments in recent years is the fact that federal immigra-

1 Cf LISA L. MILLER, THE PERILS OF FEDERALisM: RACE, POVERTY AND THE POLIICS OF
CRIMn CoNTRoRL 4-5 (2008).
3 See Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries of the
Post-September 11th "Pale of Law," 29 N.C. J. INT'L L. & Com. REG. 639, 651 (2004).
3 See Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime,
and Sovereign Power,
56 AM. U. L. REv. 367, 381-86 (2006).
41 See Teresa A. Miller, Lessons Learned, Lessons Lost: Immigration Enftrcement's
Failed Experiment With Penal Severity, 38 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 217, 233 (2010).
" See Julia Preston, Groups Protest Operation by Immigration Agents, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
17, 2012, at A25 (describing local alarm that the "immigration agency had broken an earlier
promise to avoid arrests near schools and other community gathering points").
42 See, e.g., Maggie Jones, Our Town Could Be Yours, N.Y. TIMEs MAG., July 15, 2012, at
MM34.
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tion agents, led by their union, have been actively resisting efforts by the
Obama Administration to redirect their mission and reorient their priorities. 43
B.

The View From the City

The progressive promise of the city lies in how its involvement addresses some of the limitations of political centralization. To be sure, there
are many different kinds of cities and, as a result, a range of different local
responses to immigration. Yet, as set forth above, though a few have prioritized immigration enforcement in their communities, most cities have been
resistant to or critical of the enforcement-centered approach of federal and
state policy. This section suggests that the reason for this opposition lies not
only in how urban policymakers and officials see themselves in relation to
immigration policymaking and enforcement but also in how their perspectives differ from those at the federal level.
It may seem counterintuitive at first, but the smaller jurisdictional scale
of cities is an important reason why they tend to be less enthusiastic about
immigration enforcement than federal authorities. The reason for this goes
directly to the political detachment of political centralization outlined above:
whereas federal officials are often removed from the consequences of enforcement actions, local leaders know that any such efforts will necessarily
be taking place in their own backyards. 44 In contrast to the federal agents
who might swoop into a community for an operation, local leaders and officials are repeat players. This is not to say that cities do not sometimes favor
immigration enforcement when they believe that it will serve the interests of
their communities. But, as is the case with law enforcement more generally,
this stance is often tempered by the fact that the targets of immigration enforcement are also a part of the communities that cities and local law-enforcement officials are charged with serving.
At the same time, police departments, which often find themselves on
the front lines of the federal government's immigration enforcement efforts,
cannot and do not measure their effectiveness solely with respect to the
number of immigrants deported. In stark contrast to the narrow institutional
mission of a federal agency like Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
immigration enforcement is but a part of a police department's broader mission to protect and serve its community. It makes sense then that local leaders and officials often demand a more compelling reason for why lawenforcement resources should be dedicated to immigration enforcement and
whether such a focus will serve broader goals of public safety. Even in
localities that have taken a strong stance against undocumented immigration,
local law-enforcement officials often continue to balance those policy objec-

43 See Julia Preston, Agents' Union Delays Training on New Policy on Deportation,N.Y.
TImEs, Jan. 8, 2012, at A15.
44 C
William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REv. 1969, 1973-74 (2008)
(describing the benefits of local political accountability in the criminal-justice context).
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tives with the need to maintain community relations and public trust with
immigrant residents. 45
A major reason why cities find themselves differently situated with respect to the issue of immigration is that there is simply more democratic
accountability at the local level than at the federal level. But the internal
political pressure that city leaders feel is only one source of influence on
their actions when it comes to immigration. Another is the reputation and
image that many cities want to portray to the outside world. As the legal
challenges and economic boycotts that cities instituted in response to state
immigration enforcement mandates show, 46 many cities have an interest in
staking a particular political position on immigration even if they are not
directly affected by the law that they are challenging.
The fact is, despite the formal hierarchy of local, state, and federal government in the United States, cities have long transcended-both socially
and economically-the territorial jurisdictions of which they are a part. On
the one hand, this local involvement is a reflection of the degree to which
cities are connected into and reliant upon the global economy, as the growing literature on "global cities" describes. 4 7 On the other hand, it is a reflection of the cosmopolitan culture and diversity that has long attracted people
to cities. 48 Given all of these influences, it is not surprising then that cities
often have different interests with respect to immigration. They want to attract foreign capital, recruit and retain foreign entrepreneurs, draw foreign
tourists, and foster a vibrant cosmopolitan environment. 49 But more importantly, many cities simply want to appear to be a welcoming place to live,
work, and visit.
With all this said, however, it is worth noting that cities are not necessarily eager to jump into the national debate on immigration. In most cases,
cities are "responding" to immigration simply because they have to. With
immigrants once again an integral part of the city's social and economic
fabric, most of a city's attention with respect to immigration is directed to
pragmatic issues and services that we look to cities to address. To be sure,
these tasks are not without their share of controversy; municipal policies are
often accused of inappropriately favoring one side or another in the ongoing
immigration debates-either by being too accommodating to immigrants or
not accommodating enough. At the same time, with immigration affecting

45 See, e.g., Sid R. Fuller, Police Response to PoliticalControversies:Illegal Immigrants
in Farmers Branch, POLICE CHIEF MAG. (Aug. 2008), http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/
magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction display-arch&article id= 1581&issue id 82008.
46 See Who Is Boycotting Arizona?, supra note 23.
" For a summary of the global cities literature, see M. Mark Amen, et al., Thinking
Through Global Cities, in RELOCATING GiOBAL CITIES: FROM TIH CENTER TO THE MARGINS
1, 1-6 (M. Mark Amen, et al., eds., 2006).
4 See, e.g., Jeff Malpas, Cosmopolitanism,Branding, and the Public Realm, in BRANDING
CITIEs: COSMOPOLITANISM, PAROCHIALISM, AND SOCIAL CHANG 189, 191-92 (Stephanie
Hemelryk Donald et al. eds., 2009).
49 See, e.g., Atlanta, Ga., Resolution II -R-0685 (May 2, 2011), available at http:I/citycouncil.atlantaga.gov/2011/images/adopted/0502/11RO685.pdf.
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more and more cities, municipal responses are commonly more a matter of
practical necessity than partisan politics. This doesn't mean, however, that
these actions do not have impacts that resonate more broadly in the policy
arena.
C.

The ProgressivePromise of the City

Given the limits of federal policymaking and enforcement, and the progressive orientation of cities to immigrants and immigration, there is good
reason to think that cities can be valuable sites of progressive reform. Indeed, as the following shows, they have already been effective in steering
federal immigration policymaking towards a progressive orientation. How
might progressives take advantage of cities in the immigration context?
On the one hand, it might be worthwhile to consider how, in certain
contexts, cities might be a more appealing alternative to immigration enforcement than the federal government. In other words, maybe cities should
be given a more expansive role with regard to immigration enforcement,
including more discretion over how it should be implemented. Not only
might the excesses of federal immigration enforcement be tempered by the
political accountability of local officials but an expanded role for cities also
would allow for a more flexible process for designing policies. Indeed, cities might even pave the way for effective ways of addressing immigration
without resorting to draconian government dragnets or the logic of selfdeportation.
On the other hand, irrespective of what role, if any, cities should assume in the immigration context, immigration progressives should recognize
that cities are a valuable ally. As cities have become a more central part of
the federal government's own immigration enforcement efforts, they are
gaining influence and sway over policymaking and implementation at the
federal level. In this respect, cities are now powerful political platforms
upon which efforts to effect progressive immigration reforms might be
staged. And in a policy arena prone to political stalemates and ideological
extremes, the ability to shift the political debate or shape how policies are
actually carried out on the ground can go a long way toward defining what
the policy actually is. Indeed, as outlined above, cities have already been
using their unique position to temper the excesses of immigration enforcement efforts and offer pragmatic solutions and a moderating voice in an
increasingly volatile debate.
III.

PROGRESSIVE URBANISM AND THE PERILS OF

IMMIGRATION

POLICY

We have looked at how cities are shaping our nation's approach to immigration, which I have suggested is a promising development from a progressive standpoint. But just as cities are shaping this nation's approach to
immigration, our nation's approach to immigration is also shaping the role
and power of our cities. For those progressive advocates who are primarily
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interested in progressive reforms to immigration policy and enforcement,
cities are an invaluable tool and a useful ally. But for those who are primarily interested in advancing a progressive vision of city governance and administration, the entanglement of cities in federal immigration policy poses
certain dangers.
The issue here is not with the actual impact of immigration per se, but
rather the manner in which the dominant federal approach is affecting the
nature of the city. More specifically, I argue that developments on the immigration front are advancing a disempowered and depoliticized vision of the
city while perpetuating an image of immigrants as a federal population that
is socially and politically outside of the local communities within which they
reside. As I suggest below, these two trends threaten progressive visions of
the city in very fundamental ways.
A.

Progressive City Building

Much of the engagement with cities in the progressive literature thus far
has focused primarily on how cities might contribute to progressive causes
that will likely be settled at a higher level. This posture has been the case
with respect to issues like climate change, marriage equality, and financial
regulations; it was also how the "promise" of city involvement was outlined
above with respect to immigration. Yet, in recent years, there has also been
a growing interest in the city as a progressive project itself. Some are interested in how the physical structure of cities might be built or transformed
with progressive aims in mind, such as the push for so-called "green cities."
Others are interested in how cities promote the kind of social interactions
and political engagement that promote a just and equal society."o Indeed,
political theorists like Iris Young have even begun to look to the plurality
and social interactions commonly associated with city life as a normative
model for a deep and meaningful democratic engagement."
These progressive visions of the city, however, cannot be taken for
granted. Cities might be important sites for progressive policies, but they
are not themselves automatically inclined towards progressive ends-much
depends on how their power is defined as a matter of law, a formulation that
not only affects their ability to respond to issues that they might face but also
defines their role in American society. As legal scholars have long noted,
the legal and political structures of, and surrounding, cities go a long way
toward defining how cities will behave, and to what ends they will use their
power.52 Whether cities pursue exclusionary policies in order to attract
wealthy residents and exclude the poor, or embrace a more inclusionary

See, e.g., GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITrou BUiiDING
173-79 (1999).
" See IRIs MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLILICS OF DIFFERENCE 240 (2d ed. 2011).
52 See, e.g., GERALD E. FRUG & DAVID J. BARRON, CITY BOUND: How STATES STiF E
URBAN INNOVALION 7-9 (2008).
o
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agenda aimed at enhancing the economic prospects and quality of life of a
diverse range of its residents, depends in large part on the power and incentive structure within which cities operate.
B.

The Distortionof Immigration

The peril that immigration policymaking poses to the project of progressive cities, I argue, lies in how it threatens to shape the power and incentives of the city. With respect to power, the problem is that the expanding
scope of immigration regulations not only threatens to "crowd out" local
policy innovations, especially those that target urban problems in new and
creative ways, but may lead to a more radical restructuring of the power and
purpose of cities themselves. With respect to incentives, the danger lies in
how the rhetoric and framework of the national immigration debates might
begin to affect how cities understand and perceive the challenges that they
face and how they view their relationship and role with respect to immigrant
residents. Taken together, I suggest that involvement in immigration can
have a corrosive effect on the progressive orientation of cities-not only
with respect to immigration or immigrants, but also affecting local governance more generally.
1. Immigration Policy and Local Power
At the most basic level, the expansion of federal immigration law into
areas of traditional domestic and local concern is threatening to crowd out
urban policymaking at the local level. By expansion, I am referring to the
way in which the techniques of immigration control are now embedded in a
number of different areas once thought of as the province of domestic policy. This trend would not be a problem if immigration played nice with
other regulatory systems. But because immigration has traditionally been
given broad latitude to preempt state and local laws, and because the politics
surrounding immigration often demand that immigration regulations take
precedence over most other issues, this expansion risks crowding out other
governmental regulatory innovations meant to address related but distinct
policy interests.
It is important to note that the displacement being discussed here is
both legal and political. In other words, the risk is not only that a local
regulation on, say, labor or working conditions that doesn't take into account
immigration status might run afoul of federal preemption because it happens
to "reward" undocumented immigrants in its implementation? The risk is
also that local leaders, especially those in smaller cities or towns, might be
chilled from acting on a specific policy matter because of fears that they will
be swept into intense national immigration debates.

" Cf Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 149-50 (2002).
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Viewed from this broader perspective, the encroachment of immigration on urban policymaking is widespread. For example, during the 1990s,
debates over how best to educate English learners were all but hijacked by
referendum battles organized by immigration advocates.54 Pedagogical disagreements over the relative efficacy of bilingual education and Englishimmersion programs suddenly turned into a bigger battle over immigration
policy and the ability of new immigrants to assimilate into American society." Similarly, recent local efforts to establish day-laborer centers-relatively innocuous attempts to address problems of loitering, littering, and
worker exploitation when day laborers congregate on the street to solicit
work-have attracted fierce national scrutiny simply because it is suspected
that many of these day laborers are undocumented. 6 But when legal and
political pressures cause localities to close down their centers and protesters
to leave, cities are simply left with the same local problems. What is worth
noting is that, in the vast majority of these policy disputes, there is a sensible, pragmatic, and oftentimes progressive-minded solution to an urban
problem. But because of the importance now ascribed to immigration regulations and enforcement, any proposed solution is automatically placed
under legal and political scrutiny.
Though this kind of crowding out is a matter for concern in the near
term, an even bigger problem is whether policy conflicts over immigration
might lead to more substantial structural reforms of city power and responsibilities. The biggest concern here is not so much the preemptive powers of
the federal government but rather the plenary power that states have over
their local governments."
Fear of this kind of broader structural reform is not entirely speculative.
Indeed, many of the major structural changes that cities faced in the past
were the result of immigration controversies involving state and local governments, particularly in the decades surrounding the turn of the twentieth
century. Some of these reforms were temporary, such as Massachusetts's
takeover of the Boston police department because the city had elected its
first Irish American mayor, and the state legislature felt the police force was
5 See Edward B. Fiske, Backtracking on Bilingual School Plan, INT', HERALD TRIB., Feb.
12, 2001, at 18; see also Kevin R. Johnson & George A. Martinez, Discrimination by Proxy:
The Case of Proposition227 and the Ban on Bilingual Education, 33 U.C. DAVis L. REv. 1227
(2000) (discussing constitutionality of ballot initiatives to ban bilingual education in public
schools).
See Fiske, supra note 54.
* See Editorial, Herndon, Va.'s Labors, N.Y. Timrs, Aug. 18, 2007, at A12; Richard Simon, Day Labor Site Mandate Riles D.C.; Burbank's Order That Home Depot Build a Hiring
Center Prompts Action on Capitol Hill, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 23, 2006, at A8 (describing cities
that have conditioned the construction of home-improvement stores on the store's willingness
to construct and operate day-laborer centers and a proposal in Congress to forbid such
requirements).
" See United States v. R.R. Co., 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 322, 329 (1872) ("A municipal corporation like the city of Baltimore, is a representative not only of the State, but is a portion of its
governmental power. It is one of its creatures, made for a specific purpose, to exercise within
a limited sphere the powers of the State.").
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too heavily dominated by Irish immigrants.58 Others have left more permanent marks, such as the municipal reform movement of the early twentieth
century, which sought to depoliticize local governments and narrow the
scope of urban governance in order to minimize the perceived dominance of
ethnic political machines and the immigrant voters who supported them. 9
To be sure, in contrast to the early twentieth century, there is far less
attention being paid today to the power and structure of cities and other local
governments. And with the exception of fiscal crises, the threat of state
takeovers is relatively remote. Yet as the immigration controversy at the
national level has been boiling over into state politics, there are signs to
suggest that a new round of urban restructuring is possible. In many statehouses, there is once again the growing perception that cities are too aligned
with immigrant interests. At the same time, the most recent wave of state
laws on immigration shows that state policymakers are often eager to both
target and constrain local discretion, even over local issues that just happen
to be tied to the immigration debates.
2.

Immigration Policy and Local Incentives

The threat to city power outlined above focuses on the external pressures that cities now face in the immigration arena from the federal and state
level. Another concern, however, is with respect to how immigration is distorting the incentives that cities and local leaders face and the impact this has
on the internal workings of urban governance. I focus on two such distortions here-the first is with respect to the economic cost of immigrants, and
the second is the more subtle issue of how immigrant residents are
perceived.
With respect to cost, the issue is that efforts to regulate immigration
through incentives and disincentives to immigrate are also changing the economic calculus cities and other local governments face when it comes to
their immigrant populations. In short, because of recent developments in
federal law, the "cost" of immigrants to local governments is now different
from that of natives, even when compared to those who are similarly situated. Legal immigrants who had not yet naturalized became more costly in
1996 when the federal government decided to bar them from receiving several federal means-tested benefits,0 many of which were subsequently reinstated by states and local governments out of their own coffers. 61 Moreover,
because undocumented immigrants are denied access to most federally
See JACK TA(iER, BOSLON RioTs 156-57 (2001).
For a summary of this historical development, see Rick Su, Urban Politics and the
Assimilation of Immigrant Voters, 21 Wm. & MAMY BILL RIs. J. 653, 673-76 (2012).
60 See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-193, § 400(5), (7), 110 Stat. 2105, 2260.
61 See Michael Fix & Wendy Zimmermann, The Legacy of Welfare Reform for U.S. Immigrants, in INTERNAIONAL MIGRAION: PROSPECTS SAND POLITICIES IN A GLOBAL MARKET
PLACE 335, 337-38 (Douglas S. Massey & J. Edward Taylor, eds., 2004); see also Peter H.
Schuck, The Treatment of Aliens in the United States, in PATHS 10 INCLUSION: THE INIEGRA51
5
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funded and many state-funded services, local governments often have to
fund vital services on their own6 2 (often indirectly, lest they run afoul of
federal and state laws), or suffer the consequences that result when the needs
of these residents are unmet. Of course, given the federal government's interest in tackling undocumented immigration, it sometimes changes the cost
calculus on purpose. There are already many accounts of how local sheriffs
responsible for county prisons have turned to screening for undocumented
immigrants because of the per diem the federal government offered to pay
once they have been so identified.
Even more troublesome than how federal immigration policy has altered the fiscal "costs" of immigrants from a local perspective is how the
immigration debate is starting to affect how cities view immigrant residents
in relation to their role as urban policymakers. The issue is the degree to
which cities are being encouraged to view immigrants as essentially a federal population, and thus a federal responsibility, distinct and separate from
even the local communities within which they reside. To be sure, the Supreme Court has long adopted the view that immigrants are guests and wards
of the federal government. 64 Even though the origins of this view can be
traced to early judicial efforts to protect immigrants from restrictive state
regulations, 65 it has since become the basis for portraying them as, by definition, outside of all political communities-national or subnational.6 6 As Professor Ngai suggests, it is as if the "nation's borders (the point of exclusion)
collaps[ed] into and bec[ame] indistinguishable from the interior (the space
of inclusion)." 67

lION oF MIGRANTS IN THEUNLIED STATES AND GERMANY 203, 232-33 (Peter H. Schuck &
Rainer Minz, eds., 2001).
62 These kinds of cost shifting are more common than one might think in the immigration
context. For example, although the Texas law challenged in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202
(1982), is often remembered as one prohibiting undocumented students from receiving a free
public education in the state, it actually operated by depriving local governments any state
funding for students who did not have legal status-leaving it up to the local school districts to
decide whether to fund these students on their own, ask them to pay, or bar them altogether.
See also In re Alien Children Educ. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 544, 555 (S.D. Tex. 1980) ("Even
though some school districts have opted to admit undocumented children, the State's financing
scheme penalizes them for that decision; they receive less money per pupil from the State than
school districts which exclude undocumented children.").
6 See Kristin Collins, Sheriffs Help Feds DeportIllegal Aliens, NEws & OBSERVER (Raleigh), Apr. 22, 2007, at Al ("[Sheriff] Johnson said the [section 287(g)] program has dual
benefits for Alamance County. It brings in money, because the federal government pays about
$66 a night for every immigration detainee who stays in the jail. And it rids the county of
illegal immigrants, who he contends sponge public resources and are more prone to commit
crimes than legal residents.").
6 See, e.g., Henderson v. Mayor of N.Y., 92 U.S. 259, 273-74 (1875) (describing "the
protection which the foreigner has a right to expect from the Federal government when he
lands here a stranger, owing allegiance to another government, and looking to it for such
protection as grows out of his relation to that government").
6

See, e.g., id.

6 See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1982).
67 MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILL EGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN
AMERUCA

63 (2003).
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There are already signs that the "federalization" of the immigrant population in contemporary immigration debates is starting to affect how cities
view local issues when immigrants are involved. When immigrants overcrowd inadequate housing or residents flee a community experiencing an
immigrant influx, too often the traditional local-government concerns about
affordable housing and the propensity of existing local-government laws to
promote metropolitan sprawl are cast aside to focus on the federal immigration policies that sanctioned, or failed to restrict, the immigrant's entry into
this country in the first place." When immigrant residents burden local services, questions regarding the funding structure are frequently neglected to
concentrate on the lack of federal support for the "federal" population of
immigrants.69 When immigrants deviate from local community norms by
committing crimes that are largely defined by state and local governments,
the most pressing concern is too often not how they will be punished or
rehabilitated pursuant to local laws, or how local policies can be adopted to
make our communities safer, but whether their actions constitute cause for
deportation." Indeed, even when cities erupt in violence, as they did during
the Los Angeles riots of 1992, the presence of immigrants in the midst of
this chaos leads many to demand a moratorium on future immigration instead of focusing on the concentration of poverty, racial tensions, and economic dislocation that the current local legal framework has engendered.
C.

The ProgressivePerils of Immigration Policy

The expansion of federal immigration regulations is impinging on policy arenas ordinarily viewed as local matters. At the same time, there is the
risk that the way immigrants are portrayed in the federal immigration debates is affecting how they are viewed as residents by the cities themselves.
As we saw in Part II, cities have been effective in shaping federal immigration policymaking and enforcement. But as this Part suggests, they might be
affected by these developments as well.

61 See, e.g., Editorial,Blaming Immigrants, N.Y. Timvs, Oct. 14, 2000, at A18
(describing
a campaign by Federation for American Immigration Reform blaming immigration for traffic
congestion and suburban sprawl); Charisse Jones, Crowded Houses Gaining Attention in Suburbs, USA ToDAY, Jan. 31, 2006, at A5 (describing how anger over immigration is being
played out through the issue of overcrowded housing in many communities).
" See Peter Skerry, Many Borders to Cross: Is Immigration the Exclusive Responsibility
of the FederalGovernment?, 25 Puntius 71 (1995); see also Texas v. United States, 106 F.3d
661 (5th Cir. 1997); Arizona v. United States, 104 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 1997); California v.
United States, 104 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 1997); New Jersey v. United States, 91 F.3d 463 (3d
Cir. 1996); Padavan v. United States, 82 F.3d 23 (2d Cir. 1996); Chiles v. United States, 69
F.3d 1094 (11th Cir. 1995).
7o See Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and
Limited Scope of ProposedReforms, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1936, 1949-50 (2000).
71See, e.g., Otis L. Graham Jr. & Roy Beck, To Help Inner City, Cut Flow of Immigrants,
L.A. TIMEs, May 19, 1992, at B7; Edward N. Luttwak, The Riots: Underclass vs. Immigrants,
N.Y. Timvs, May 15, 1992, at A29; Jack Miles, Blacks vs. Browns, ATLANTIC MONTHIN, Oct.
1992, at 41.
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Though the focus is on how immigration policy and perception of immigrants might be shaping urban governance, the danger I suggest here is
more than just how immigrants might be treated at the local level. Even
more important is how immigration policy might distort how cities approach
urban governance more generally. One such concern is that city leaders will
have a misguided view of local problems and the steps necessary to address
them. In other words, not only might immigrants be unfairly blamed but the
fundamental roots of the problem might be overlooked as well.
A related danger is that cities will begin to demand federal solutions to
what are essentially local problems. In other words, instead of being
crowded out of a policy area of local concern, cities may be tempted to
withdraw from a specific sphere of urban policymaking because they believe
that it is ultimately the federal government's responsibility to fix these
problems.
IV.

CONCLUSION: RECONCILING THE PROMISE AND THE PERIL OF

IMMIGRATION

LOCALISM

Cities across the United States are now actively engaged with federal
immigration policymaking and enforcement. As I argue above, this poses
both promise and peril for advocates of progressive policies. For those interested in immigration, I argue, cities are moderating the excesses of federal
immigration enforcement and plotting a pragmatic path to more meaningful
reform. For those focused on cities, however, this engagement has distorted
a number of local policy issues and threatens to undermine the relationship
between the city and its immigrant residents. Given the promise and peril of
this relationship, what is a progressive to do?
It is probably too late to think that we can avoid this problem by disengaging the city from immigration policymaking and enforcement. Even if
we wanted to, it is unlikely that the expansion of our federal immigration
laws, which are responsible for the increasing overlap between federal immigration regulations and spheres of domestic and local control, can be rolled
back. In other words, having expanded their reach into the workplace and
the criminal-justice system, it is unlikely that immigration regulations will
ever retreat back to the borders. And as long as that overlap exists, there
will simply be no agreement on what noninvolvement actually looks like.
When a city establishes a day-laborer center that does not check the immigration status of its users, swarms of demonstrators descend to protest the
city's "immigration policy." Yet if a city does the opposite, and decides that
it wants to check the immigration status not only of day laborers but of all
employees in the town, there will likely be others eager to denounce the
city's effort to regulate immigration. The problem with the popular appeal
for city disengagement is that disengagement looks very different from different perspectives.
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If disengagement is not a possible solution, then maybe the solution is
to find ways to reconcile the two-in other words, to enhance the promise of
city engagement in federal immigration policymaking and enforcement,
while minimizing the danger this engagement poses to progressive visions of
the city. Instead of disengagement, a solution along these lines may require
more formal recognition of the city's role. Might they be institutionally integrated into the policymaking process? Might they be formally consulted
when designing interior enforcement strategies? Maybe they should take a
more active role in spearheading federal immigration enforcement efforts in
their communities-informed by federal immigration objectives on the one
hand, while moderated by local political accountability on the other.
If we are to reconcile the promise and peril of city involvement, finding
ways not only to restore but also to strengthen the connections between the
federal and the local may be the best alternative for progressives to pursue.
At this point, however, it might be enough to simply recognize that when it
comes to the interaction between cities and immigration policy, there are
indeed two sides to the equation-immigration and the city-that need to be
considered.

